PLANTING FOR DOLLARS
Posted November 16, 2020
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TREE PLANTING FOR THE CLIMATE IN THE WEST AND FOR THE $$$ IN THE THE THIRD WORLD. MOST OF THE PLANTING IS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH. IN THE GLOBAL NORTH THE LEADERS ARE THE USA, SPAIN, AND FRANCE. ALSO CANADA, THE UK, AND GERMANY.


HERE ARE THE TREE PLANTING LEADERS OF THE WORLD: LINK TO SOURCE: https://www.uniguide.com/countries-planting-the-most-trees/
COUNTRY | TREES PLANTED | %IMPACT |
China | 2,407,149,493 | 0.080238% |
India | 2,159,420,898 | 0.071981% |
Ethiopia | 1,725,350,234 | 0.057512% |
Pakistan | 1,006,776,724 | 0.033559% |
Mexico | 789,307,032 | 0.026310% |
Turkey | 711,103,088 | 0.023703% |
Peru | 646,502,236 | 0.021550% |
Nigeria | 626,725,667 | 0.020891% |
Kenya | 534,680,609 | 0.017823% |
United States | 315,586,982 | 0.010520% |
Ghana | 220,571,208 | 0.007352% |
Italy | 211,269,211 | 0.007042% |
Myanmar | 192,154,935 | 0.006405% |
Philippines | 187,393,371 | 0.006246% |
Tanzania | 159,635,654 | 0.005321% |
Brazil | 144,078,245 | 0.004803% |
Cuba | 137,476,944 | 0.004583% |
Canada | 137,302,121 | 0.004577% |
Algeria | 128,124,520 | 0.004271% |
Burundi | 119,430,669 | 0.003981% |
Indonesia | 115,216,883 | 0.003841% |
Spain | 107,675,557 | 0.003589% |
Romania | 66,578,366 | 0.002219% |
South Korea | 58,725,859 | 0.001958% |
France | 40,510,631 | 0.001350% |
Estonia | 39,009,236 | 0.001300% |
Venezuela | 36,702,957 | 0.001223% |
Azerbaijan | 34,382,212 | 0.001146% |
Afghanistan | 34,019,233 | 0.001134% |
Benin | 30,742,992 | 0.001025% |
Morocco | 28,004,559 | 0.000933% |
Costa Rica | 25,518,682 | 0.000851% |
Belgium | 23,785,880 | 0.000793% |
Uganda | 21,866,960 | 0.000729% |
Tunisia | 21,008,735 | 0.000700% |
Senegal | 20,134,702 | 0.000671% |
Paraguay | 20,009,395 | 0.000667% |
Chile | 18,013,132 | 0.000600% |
Guatemala | 16,607,081 | 0.000554% |
United Kingdom | 14,550,507 | 0.000485% |
Japan | 14,093,513 | 0.000470% |
Colombia | 13,795,002 | 0.000460% |
Norway | 12,788,611 | 0.000426% |
Sri Lanka | 12,242,859 | 0.000408% |
Sierra Leone | 12,002,662 | 0.000400% |
Australia | 11,908,134 | 0.000397% |
Malaysia | 10,652,529 | 0.000355% |
Iraq | 10,241,091 | 0.000341% |
Thailand | 9,026,174 | 0.000301% |
Ecuador | 8,924,626 | 0.000297% |
Egypt | 8,542,581 | 0.000285% |
Germany | 8,523,687 | 0.000284% |
Taiwan | 7,642,099 | 0.000255% |
Panama | 7,265,456 | 0.000242% |
Bangladesh | 6,902,528 | 0.000230% |
Cameroon | 6,584,745 | 0.000219% |
Guinea | 6,566,406 | 0.000219% |
Nicaragua | 6,425,810 | 0.000214% |
Argentina | 6,157,386 | 0.000205% |
Gambia | 5,021,900 | 0.000167% |
Kyrgyzstan | 5,000,000 | 0.000167% |
South Africa | 4,862,997 | 0.000162% |
Austria | 4,574,901 | 0.000152% |
United Arab Emirates | 4,225,576 | 0.000141% |
Israel | 4,110,451 | 0.000137% |
Congo-Brazzaville | 3,962,389 | 0.000132% |
Nepal | 3,575,197 | 0.000119% |
Malawi | 3,330,822 | 0.000111% |
Zambia | 3,298,344 | 0.000110% |
Jordan | 2,607,803 | 0.000087% |
Armenia | 2,368,641 | 0.000079% |
Poland | 2,340,731 | 0.000078% |
Timor-Leste | 2,155,000 | 0.000072% |
Sweden | 2,126,561 | 0.000071% |
Albania | 2,045,300 | 0.000068% |
New Zealand | 1,970,374 | 0.000066% |
Portugal | 1,655,575 | 0.000055% |
Congo-Kinshasa | 1,554,353 | 0.000052% |
Mali | 1,516,153 | 0.000051% |
Ireland | 1,464,908 | 0.000049% |
Madagascar | 1,423,385 | 0.000047% |
Rwanda | 1,404,081 | 0.000047% |
Netherlands | 1,301,800 | 0.000043% |
Laos | 1,166,249 | 0.000039% |
Mozambique | 1,127,183 | 0.000038% |
Fiji | 1,077,897 | 0.000036% |
Mongolia | 1,041,376 | 0.000035% |
Turkmenistan | 880,001 | 0.000029% |
Cambodia | 833,582 | 0.000028% |
Burkina Faso | 693,355 | 0.000023% |
Montenegro | 650,837 | 0.000022% |
Bolivia | 639,298 | 0.000021% |
Sudan | 610,981 | 0.000020% |
Mauritius | 561,885 | 0.000019% |
Mauritania | 475,230 | 0.000016% |
Serbia | 424,452 | 0.000014% |
Haiti | 423,243 | 0.000014% |
Zimbabwe | 408,356 | 0.000014% |
Togo | 367,165 | 0.000012% |
Brunei | 336,459 | 0.000011% |
TOTAL | 13,593,004,090 | 0.45310% |
TREES CUT | 5000000000 | 0.166667% |
NET GAIN | 8,593,004,090 | 0.286433% |
YEARS TO BREAK EVEN | 349 YEARS |
LINK TO POST ON THE CARBON CREDITS MARKET: https://tambonthongchai.com/2019/09/30/cer/
EXCERPT: Carbon credits are created by the combination of permits, offsets, and tradability. The permit is permission granted to a country, company or organization to produce a certain amount of emissions any portion of which can then be sold in the carbon credits market if not used. A complexity in the carbon trading scheme is the offset provision. It provides an incentive to firms or countries with no emission reduction obligation to invest in climate action the net effect of which may be sold to countries, firms, or individuals to cancel out a portion of their emissions. This provision is commonly seen in air travel where airlines buy offsets that cancel out the emissions from a flight and then sell the offset to passengers who wish to be carbon neutral. However, unlike the emission trading in the acid rain program, the climate change implementation of what appears to be the same provision is less well defined and vastly more complicated. First, there is no well defined legal superstructure for its regulation and implementation such that the structure and procedures are poorly defined and poorly regulated. Secondly, the emission problem to be solved by emission trading is poorly defined.
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A specific issue pointed out in [Sovacool, “Four Problems with Global Carbon Markets, Energy & Environment, Vol. 22, No. 6 (2011), pp. 681-694] is non-linearity. As described in related posts on this site, a complexity with the carbon budget is that the remaining carbon budget cannot be computed by subtraction or by linear proportionality but must be recomputed because of the non-linearity of the progression of the carbon budget through the time span of its implementation [LINK] [LINK] . Yet carbon credit trading and carbon offset markets necessarily assume a linear relationship. Therefore the basis of the pricing changes over the time span of the credit but the pricing does not. In “Why are carbon markets failing? The Guardian, Fri 12 Apr 2013, Steffen Böhm, Professor of management and sustainability at Essex Business School points out the absence of government and regulatory oversight with well defined rules and definitions and their enforcement in the emission trading system of the carbon credit market. As pointed out above in the comparison with the Acid Rain Program, although the carbon credit market is derived from a comparison with the Acid Rain Program, the parallel is lacking the the well defined legal and governance superstructure that oversaw and ensured the success of the acid rain program. Dr. Böhm thus describes the carbon credit and offset market as inefficient and corrupt and says that the carbon trading system has failed citing these structural deficiencies as reasons for its failure.
The essential problem here, not just in the carbon credits market, but in the entire enterprise for saving the planet with climate action, is that the government, regulatory, legal, and management superstructure is the United Nations which sees itself as the EPA of the world in the comparison with the Acid Rain Program but it is not the EPA and has none of the EPA’s governance and regulatory powers, skills, and ability that made the acid rain program a success. This is the fundamental flaw in the assumed parallel between the acid rain program and the carbon credits market.
It is precisely this absence of governance and regulatory oversight that things like the Shell offset story can happen [Shell will spend $300 million to offset carbon emissions. Here’s the catch, By Akshat Rathi, Quartz, April 10, 2019]. Here Mr. Rathi reports that Shell sells carbon offsets to its customers in the Netherlands and uses those proceeds to buy carbon credits at the carbon credits market. If the carbon credits were truly a reduction that could be checked and verified and overseen by a professional body such as the EPA, it may have some validity but what we have is a dysfunctional bureaucracy at the UN as the sole governing and regulatory body of the carbon credits market. This regulatory vacuum also explains the ability of logging companies who plant and harvest trees anyway to sell carbon credits every time they plant. And in terms of climate action carbon budgets, the emission reduction in the books contains carbon credits purchased by Annex1 countries from dubious projects in nonAnnex countries such as the alleged “preservation” of forests that probably would have been there anyway.

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