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CHINA CLIMATE ACTION DECLARATIONS

Posted on: October 25, 2020

Confucianism - OMF (U.S.)

CONTEXT: In late 2020, Chinese leaders made a climate change announcement that is interpreted in the West as a climate action pledge with the widely held belief in the West that the announcement means that the world’s largest fossil fuel emitter will cut emissions to fight climate change.

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HERE IS THE CHINESE ANNOUNCEMENT AS REPORTED BY THE BBC

China will aim to hit peak emissions before 2030 and for carbon neutrality by 2060, President Xi Jinping has announced. Mr Xi outlined the steps China will take in a videolink to the UN General Assembly. The announcement is being seen as a significant step in the fight against climate change. China is the world’s biggest source of carbon dioxide, responsible for around 28% of global emissions.

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BEFORE CHINA’S 2020 CLIMATE ACTION PLAN THEY HAD A 2015 CLIMATE ACTION PLAN

CHINA ANNOUNCES ITS CLIMATE ACTION PLAN

Ahead of the Paris climate summit, Prime Minister Li Kegiang reaffirmed a November agreement to cap emissions by 2030. China plans to cut CO2 emissions 60 percent below 2005 levels and increase renewable energy consumption 20 percent by 2030. BBC

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STEVEN LEE MYERS EXPLAINS CHINA’S POSITION (NYT)

Environmentalists have welcomed the pledge by China’s leader, Xi Jinping, to speed up reductions in emissions in the world’s top-polluting nation and reach carbon neutrality by 2060. The ambitious goal, which surprised many experts, could help significantly slow global warming. They warned, however, that Mr. Xi had offered almost no detail, raising doubts about the viability of targets that remain years in the future. China has long argued that as a developing economy it should not have to share the same burden of curbing emissions as developed nations whose pollution went unchecked for decades. China is now pledging to lead by example, setting itself goals befitting a country that aspires to be a superpower. Under the Paris climate deal reached in 2015, China pledged that its emissions would peak around 2030. And in 2020, Mr. Xi promises to move up that timetable, though he did not provide specifics. The bigger surprise, analysts said, was Mr. Xi’s pledge to reach “carbon neutrality” — meaning China’s net emissions will reach zero by 2060. China is now on record setting the goal for the first time. There are plenty of reasons for caution. In recent years, analysts have warned about worrisome trends in the country’s commitment to fight global warming in the face of economic slowdowns. Coal consumption, which had declined from 2013 to 2017, driven in part by a push to improve China’s notorious air quality, began to rise again in recent years as the economy faced economic headwinds and the government sought to stimulate industrial growth. The rise was interrupted by the Covid-19 shutdown. China’s economy is recovering from the Covid slowdown more quickly than others. Research by Mr. Myllyvirta has shown that by May, carbon dioxide emissions from energy production, cement making and other industrial uses were 4 percent higher than the year before. China also granted more construction permits for coal-fired power plants in the first six months of 2020 than it had each year in 2018 and 2019. Mr. Xi, in laying out his country’s plans in a speech at the United Nations, did not detail how China would meet the targets. Li Shuo, a policy adviser for Greenpeace China, said that the lack of specificity was probably intended to leave the Communist Party leadership flexibility in the short term to pursue an economic rebound following the pandemic. The government’s next five-year plan, to be released soon, will be a key document, detailing the necessary economic, industrial and environmental changes that will be necessary. While China clings to industries that are consumers of coal, it has also emerged as a leader in clean energy technologies, including solar panels and wind turbines. It is the world’s largest manufacturer of electric cars and buses. That could leave the government well positioned to make a transition away from fossil fuels, provided the political commitment is there. China could also ramp up its ambitions to build nuclear power plants to replace coal-fired plants, though that would prompt other environmental and safety questions. Wang Wenbin, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, touted the growth of renewable energy, saying China’s capacity now accounted for 30 percent of the world’s total. Meeting the new goals “reflects China’s willingness to work with other countries to build a vigorous, clean and beautiful world with a shared future for mankind. Mr. Xi has previously pledged to increase government support for new technologies, while doing more to fight pollution, protect natural resources and expand the country’s national park networks. Preserving the Communist Party’s power remains his first priority, but pollution and other environmental threats are increasingly seen as threats to the party’s standing. That was evident in this summer’s devastating floods on the Yangtze River and its tributaries in central China. “Humankind can no longer afford to ignore the repeated warnings of nature,” Mr. Xi said on Tuesday, addressing the General Assembly by video.

Solar Manufacturing Limited in China | SolarFeeds Marketplace

CHINA’S GLOBAL ECONOMIC AMBITIONS AND CLIMATE CHANGE

BIBLIOGRAPHY: CLIMATE ACTION IN CHINA

  1. Lewis, Joanna I. “China’s strategic priorities in international climate change negotiations.” Washington Quarterly 31.1 (2008): 155-174. Climate Action in China: Although the goal of “building a resource-efficient and environment-friendly society” is prominent in China’s current five-year plan, many obstacles must be overcome before achieving it. These challenges shape the way China is approaching climate mitigation at the domestic level, as well as its position in international negotiations. A look at the Chinese institutions that have been responsible for climate change policy is one way to understand how the government has approached this issue over time. Starting in the 1980s, China treated climate change as a scientific issue and gave the State Meteorological Administration the responsibility of advising the government on policy options in international negotiations surrounding the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). As political awareness and sensitivity surrounding climate change increased in the late 1990s, this role shifted to the more powerful State Development and Planning Commission, which has since evolved into the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The move indicated a shift in the relative value given to the issue, as well as perhaps a shift in perspective from a scientific issue to predominantly a development issue. The NDRC also serves as the primary energy policy decision-making authority in China, and this move may have reflected the clear need for climate priorities to be coordinated better with energy decisions. It is now home to the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change, which oversees climate activities within the NDRC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). Today, the NDRC and the Foreign Ministry are responsible for formulating China’s international negotiation positions. Further institutional change came recently with the release of China’s nation.
  2. China’s climate change policy: Domestic and international developments G Heggelund – Asian perspective, 2007 – JSTOR: This article demonstrates that prospects for emission reduction are not realistic under the current policy environment, and China is unlikely to take on commitments in the near future. The major determinants of and actors involved in China’s climate change policy are discussed, relating these to China’s stance in global climate change negotiations. Energy is seen as the key to economic development and is one of the main causes for China’s unwillingness to take on emission reduction commitments. Vulnerability to climate change is an emerging issue in China, and could contribute to elevating the climate change issue on China’s domestic agenda in the future. Global climate change is still seen as a remote matter by the country’s policy makers, and remains a foreign-policy issue. International pressure has not been able to change Beijing’s stance of no commitments, although China is now an active participant in the Clean Development Mechanism (COM), which has become a way to apply an international mechanism on domestic problems and one of the channels that China itself prefers to use in its climate-change efforts. {Asian Perspective presents critical analysis of the global, regional, and transnational issues affecting Northeast Asia. The journal brings cogent, thought-provoking examination of the significant developments in Asia and the world and promotes a healthy exchange of ideas among scholars, students, and policymakers.}
  3. Richerzhagen, Carmen, and Imme Scholz. “China’s capacities for mitigating climate change.” World Development 36.2 (2008): 308-324. Economic growth and structural change have turned China into the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world. The country has no international commitments to reduce its emissions, but it has developed domestic policies and climate-relevant capacities which do have mitigative effects. Economic and political reforms have supported capacity development. However, so far China’s climate-relevant actions have not been influenced by climate considerations. Potential emission reductions are mainly a by-product of measures embedded in energy and transport policies aimed at cutting energy costs and increasing energy security.
  4. Heggelund, Gørild M., and Inga Fritzen Buan. “China in the Asia–Pacific Partnership: consequences for UN climate change mitigation efforts?.” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 9.3 (2009): 301-317. This article discusses China’s motives for participation in the Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), and whether this has or will have consequences for its participation and efforts in the UN track of international climate governance. In order to discuss these issues, it also provides an outline of key national priorities and explains the nature of China’s involvement in both the UN track and the APP. It suggests that the APP is a complement to the UN process, not a competitor, in the case of China. APP participation represents a win–win situation in terms of the transfer of technology and know-how for solving challenges related to energy security and greenhouse gas emissions. For the Chinese leadership, this seems preferable to taking on UN commitments which it fears would impede economic development. The APP’s projects also seem to complement the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism project in China. This article argues that there is little indication that China would make less of an effort under the UN track.
  5. Jeon, Hyung-Kwon, and Seong-Suk Yoon. “From international linkages to internal divisions in China: The political response to climate change negotiations.” Asian Survey 46.6 (2006): 846-866. In negotiations about climate change, China has participated as both a cooperator and a defector. To explain China’s contradictory attitude, this article examines both international and domestic factors. Although international linkages played an important role in earlier stages, their influence was significantly limited by domestic constraints as the negotiations deepened.
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CHINA’S ECONOMIC INTEREST IN CLIMATE ACTION

SOLAR PANEL MANFACTURE AND EXPORT

China's Solar-Panel Makers Dominate Global Exports - Caixin Global

WIND TURBINE MANUFACTURING AND EXPORT

GE confirms plan to build world's biggest wind turbine in China | Recharge
Wind turbine manufacturing, Nantong, Jiangsu, China Stock Photo - Alamy

Record Vestas wind blade cargo on giant boat from China | Recharge

THE RISE OF CHINA AND APPREHENSION IN THE WEST

  1. White, Hugh. “Power shift: rethinking Australia’s place in the Asian century.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 65.1 (2011): 81-93. Australian foreign and strategic policy has not yet begun to address the implications for Australia’s international situation of China’s growing power. China today already challenges the American leadership that has kept Asia peaceful and Australia secure for many decades. There are real and growing risks that Washington and Beijing will not find a way to work together peacefully as relative power shifts from one to the other. Unless they do, Asia’s future is bleak, and so is Australia’s. Australia therefore needs to work to promote a new order in Asia which accommodates China’s power without conceding more than is necessary to keep the peace. This will mean encouraging America to forgo primacy in Asia in favour of working with China and others in a shared regional leadership. Australia also needs to start preparing for the possibility that Asia will become a more contested and dangerous place over coming decades, and consider what its options would be. None of them appear attractive.
  2. Phillips, Andrew. “A dangerous synergy: energy securitization, great power rivalry and strategic stability in the Asian century.” The Pacific Review 26.1 (2013): 17-38. This paper analyzes the current and prospective implications of Asia’s energy consumption revolution for regional stability. Adopting a comparative and historical approach, I argue that Japanese energy security anxieties worked to reinforce regional alignment patterns in East Asia for nearly two decades following the Shanghai communiqué, thereby strengthening regional stability. Conversely, the post-Cold War period has seen in China and India’s rise the emergence of Asian energy super-consumers that are not formally aligned with the United States, but that are increasingly dependent on imported energy supplies to fuel their industrialization. This newfound dependence on energy imports has seen both countries follow Japan’s longstanding example in securitizing energy as a policy issue. In the context of an already more contested Asia, this trend towards energy securitization has aggravated regional tensions and will continue to do so unless greater efforts are undertaken bilaterally, regionally and globally to foster more effective forms of energy cooperation.
  3. Hartig, Falk. “Confucius Institutes and the rise of China.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 17.1 (2012): 53-76. Since 2004 China has set up over 700 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms around the world to promote its language and culture and thereby to shape its image as a global player. Despite this impressive number Confucius Institutes are surprisingly understudied, especially in terms of their actual structure, operation mode and activities. This paper uses German Confucius Institutes as a case study to bridge this gap. It first discusses the concepts of public and cultural diplomacy and culture institutes as a conceptual tool to analyze Confucius Institutes. It then turns to the case study to provide empirical data to better understand this instrument of China’s image shaping efforts. It argues that Confucius Institutes are connected to the rise of China and a unique member of the family of national culture institutes.
  4. A Balancing Act: China’s Role in Climate Change. Karl Hallding, Guoyi Han and Marie Olsson. 2009: Climate change has reached the apex of the global agenda at a time when China faces significant development and energy security challenges. The political leadership and leading intellectuals are debating the direction of a new development pathway that provides both growth to meet development objectives, and dramatically reduces energy intensity and pollution. There are four key aspects that illustrate how climate change is conceived by the Chinese leadership. This signals that China may come to play a much more important role in global mitigation of climate change than was thought only a couple of years ago. The leadership’s main concern is with the impacts on economic and social stability and the interplay with other development and environmental challenges. There are considerable low-carbon opportunities for China. Geopolitics: China’s ambition to be seen as a responsible world actor influences its range of options within global climate talks. Development: Climate change is still predominantly a development issue in China. There are tradeoffs due to the harm that climate action can cause to development. Development is fueled by energy and China’s priority is development. Energy security is one of China’s priorities, closely linked with concern’s of economic development, poverty alleviation and social stability. The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party depends on its ability to deliver continued reform and development, – it is also about political survival. Since 1994, domestic oil supply has not keep pace with demand and China is presently covering half of its oil demand from imports. With increasing demands from transportation and petrochemicals, China’s dependency on imported oil and on coal imports is rising as as domestic production cannot meet increasing demands in the rapidly developing eastern provinces. China shows its political commitment to climate action by setting ambitious targets that bear on climate mitigation and adaptation but these targets are normally not met. For example the target of 15 percent renewables in the primary energy mix by 2020 remains a target. China is now getting closer to meeting its 20 percent energy intensity reduction target but that too remains a target.
  5. Hilton, Isabel, and Oliver Kerr. “The Paris Agreement: China’s ‘New Normal’role in international climate negotiations.” Climate Policy 17.1 (2017): 48-58. Contributing to the political success of the Paris Agreement was China’s emergence as a more positive participant in the international climate change negotiations. Despite efforts to reduce energy and carbon intensity since the mid-2000s, Chinese negotiators in Copenhagen were careful not to link domestic action on climate change to any presumptions of international obligation. This stands in marked contrast to Paris where, for the first time, China was willing to commit to an absolute cap on emissions subject to international measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV). This article examines what changed between 2009 and 2015 such that China was able to play a more constructive role in the global climate regime. It argues that a key driver of change was China’s shift to a ‘New Normal’ model of economic development. Beginning in the 12th Five Year Plan Period (2011–2015), China’s economic policy prioritized a transition from energy-intensive growth based on heavy industry, exports and investment, to a more balanced economy characterized by slower growth, an increasing role for services and domestic consumption, and a focus on innovation and low-carbon technologies. This transition gave China the opportunity to re-formulate its priorities in international climate negotiations and helped pave the way for increased climate cooperation with the US, the lack of which had been a major roadblock to success in Copenhagen. Progress was further facilitated by a range of external factors, including impressive French diplomacy in the run-up to COP21 and the important shift to a bottom-up, voluntary approach to commitments.

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ONLINE COMMENTARIES IN THE WEST ON CHINESE CLIMATE ACTION DECLARATIONS

  1. ECOWATCH: China’s President Xi Jinping surprised the global community recently by committing his country to net-zero emissions by 2060. China currently accounts for about 28% of global carbon emissions – double the U.S. contribution and three times the European Union’s. Meeting the pledge will demand a deep transition of not just China’s energy system, but its entire economy. It remains to be seen whether China’s climate promise is genuine, or simply a ploy to win international favor.
  2. XINHUANET: There is no doubt that efforts from China will play a major role in shaping how the rest of the world progresses on climate action, especially in the absence of U.S. federal leadership.
  3. GUARDIAN: China will reach carbon neutrality before 2060 and ensure its greenhouse gas emissions peak in the next decade, Xi Jinping has told the UN general assembly. China will scale up its intended nationally determined contributions [under the Paris climate agreement] by adopting more vigorous policies and measures, the Chinese president said, calling for a “green recovery” from the coronavirus pandemic. The forthright commitment will give fresh impetus to the UN’s efforts to galvanise action on the climate crisis which has been flagging.
  4. CHINA DAILY: China’s pledge to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060-that is, netzero carbon emissions-puts the country on a transformative development path. Net-zero carbon emissions will be a ginormous turnaround in four decades and has to be done without too much negative impact on economic development. President Xi Jinping’s announcement at the United Nations on Sept 22 marked the first time China has set an absolute rather than a carbon-intensity target tied to GDP growth. In other words, it is much more ambitious. The pledge by China, as one of the world’s biggest carbon emitters, is just beginning to be digested around the world and will reverberate across energy, commodities and financial markets for a long time. Its new pledge represents a leading bid in meeting the climate-change mitigation challenge. The implications are profound.
  5. DIALOGO CHINO: In a virtual address to the 75th UN General Assembly on 22 September, Chinese President Xi Jinping said China would reach peak emissions before 2030 and strive to reach carbon neutrality before 2060. These pledges are a significant step forward in climate ambition from the world’s largest carbon emitter and second largest economy. All governments are required to deliver tougher climate targets under the Paris Agreement ahead of COP26, which were delayed until 2021 because of Covid-19. With commitments from the EU and China, well over a third of global emissions will be covered by new, tougher targets.
  6. NYT: China’s Pledge to Be Carbon Neutral by 2060: Under international pressure to do more to address global warming, Xi Jinping made a surprise commitment to drastically reduce emissions. Now comes the hard part – actually doing it.
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CRITICAL COMMENTARY AND CONCLUSIONS

(1) China is the world’s largest emitter of fossil fuel emissions. With a population of 1.4 billion and per capita emissions of 7.2 metric tonnes of CO2 per person, China’s total emissions are 10.08 gigatons of CO2 that represents about 27.5% of global emissions. The climate change focus on China derives from this significant statistic. Overlooked in this statistic is that these emissions come mostly from export oriented manufacturing and not from consumption with much of the industry consisting of overseas manufacturing facilities of Western business enterprise. Although China is the largest economy in the world with a gross national GDP of $27 trillion in 2019, this figure is driven largely by industry and by population and not by consumption and living standard. A partial list of Western business enterprises that operate their factories in China, provided by JIESWORLD.COM, appears below. These factories and their products are of the West by the West and for the West but their emissions appear in China’s account. The West has exported its emissions to China.

(2) An important sector of export oriented industrial production in China that contributes to much of the fossil fuel emissions noted above, is the manufacture of solar panels, wind turbines, and electric cars for export. The importer of these products benefits from emission reduction but the emissions for their manufacture accumulate in China’s emission account. In 2019 China exported about $18 billion of solar panels with total energy production capacity of more than 200 GW. The export of wind turbines that year was $12 billion with energy capacity of more than 400 MW. Thus, much of the West’s manufacturing emissions including the emissions from the manufacture of renewable energy equipment is offloaded to China. {Footnote: China’s domestically installed renewable energy capacity is about 400 GW divided almost equally between wind and solar}.

(3): With regard to the wealth of China described as the largest economy in the world, it should be noted that the gross GDP of the country was $14.4 trillion in 2019 compared with $21.4 trillion for the USA but in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), the adjusted PPP GDP are China $25.3 and USA $17 trillion. This PPP-GDP comparison is the basis of the assessment that China is the largest economy in the world – but this direct comparison of PPP-GDP as a measure of the wealth and standard of living is flawed in a financial context because the poorer you are and the lower your cost of living, the higher your PPP-GDP gets. The GPD assessment also contains the hidden flaw that China’s GDP derives not from consumption but from export oriented industrial production that makes goods for export to the West at lower cost than would be possible in the West. In terms of per capita consumption, China lags way behind the West with $3,224 per person in 2019 compared with $45,000 in the USA. The analysis provided above implies that significant social and structural differences make it impossible to make a direct comparison of gross national GDP and that therefore from the consumer’s point of view, China is not the richest country in the world.

(4) A similar error is found in a direct comparison of emissions. First, emissions in China are primarily industrial emissions and not consumer emissions. Second, much of these emissions come from two sources that have a direct link to the West. These are, (i) Western firms that have chosen to locate their factory in China, and (ii) Chinese factories that are making solar panels and wind turbines for the West. The ownership of these emissions must therefore have a more rational distribution than a single minded consideration of national boundaries. An implication of these complexities is that climate action emission accounting must be global because it cannot be understood on a country by country basis. This issue is discussed in a related post on this site: LINK: https://tambonthongchai.com/2020/05/22/climate-catch22/

(5) There is also a cultural issue in the emission confrontation between China and the West. Absolute literal truth no matter how ugly is a foundational principle of Western Civilization. Confucian philosophy contains the Li Principle. It affirms that manners are a primary means by which we express moral attitudes and carry out important moral goals. Confucian views on ritual extend this insight further by emphasizing the role that manners play in cultivating good character and in finding the conceptual boundaries of manners. What we call etiquette, social customs, and ritual Confucians see as expressions of Li , something we would understand as decorum. It expresses moral character and attitude. Li expresses the principle that good etiquette and good manners cultivate and express good intentions and good character. {SOURCE: Cline, E.M. The Boundaries of Manners: Ritual and Etiquette in Confucianism. Dao 15, 241–255 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-016-9490-1 (abbreviated and edited)}

(6) CONCLUSION: We propose in this post that the arguments presented in items (1) to (4) above imply that a confrontational attitude of the West with respect to China’s emissions contains serious weaknesses because the complexity of this issue is not taken into account. The Chinese response to Western demands for a greater climate action role of China is best understood in this light and in terms of the principle of Li in Confucianism.

An additional consideration is that a demand that China should live up to its commitments in the Paris Accord overlooks the weaknesses and inconsistencies in the details of what is called the “Paris Agreement” as discussed in a related issue on this site: LINK: https://tambonthongchai.com/2020/04/04/11245/

Here Xi Jinping has risen above the petty arguments in items (1) to (4) to calm the discourse with declarations of good intentions and expressions of good character that should probably be understood in terms of the Principle of Li in Confucianism. A bitter confrontation is not in either party’s interest because of the deep economic linkages described above.

Yet, these expressions of Li may have been taken literally in the West. The communication is likely made difficult by cultural differences.

Made in China: GM Might Introduce Chinese-Made Buicks to US Market -  Sputnik International

A SMALL SAMPLE OF THE LONG LIST OF WESTERN BUSINESSES THAT OPERATE THEIR FACTORIES IN CHINA

Abercrombe & Fitch, Abbott Laboratories, Acer Electronics, Adidas, AGI- American Gem Institute, Agrilink Foods, Inc., Allergan Laboratories, American Eagle Outfitters, American Standard, American Tourister, Ames Tools, Amphenol Corporation, Amway Corporation, Analog Devices, Inc., Apple Computer, Armani, Armour Meats, Ashland Chemical, Ashley Furniture, Audi Motors, AudioVox, AutoZone, Inc., Avon, Banana Republic, Bausch & Lomb, Inc., Baxter International, Bed, Bath & Beyond, Belkin Electronics, Best Foods, Big 5 Sporting Goods, Black & Decker, Body Shop, Borden Foods, Briggs & Stratton, Calrad Electric, Campbell ‘s Soup, Canon Electronics, Carole Cable, Casio Instrument, Caterpillar, Inc., CBC America, CCTV Outlet, Checker Auto, Cisco Systems, Chiquita Brands International, Claire’s Boutique, Cobra Electronics, Coby Electronics, Coca Cola Foods, Colgate-Palmolive, Colorado Spectrum, ConAgra Foods, Cooper Tire, Corning, Inc., Coleman Sporting Goods, Compaq, Crabtree & Evelyn, Cracker Barrel Stores, Craftsman Tools, Cummins, Inc., Dannon Foods, Dell Computer, Del Monte Foods, Dewalt Tools, Dial Corporation, Diebold, Inc., Dillard’s, Inc., Dodge-Phelps, Dole Foods, Dow-Corning, Eastman Kodak, EchoStar, Eclipse CCTV, Edge Electronics Group, Electric Vehicles USA, Inc., Eli Lilly Company, Emerson Electric, Enfamil, Estee Lauder, Eveready, Fisher Scientific, Ford Motors, Frito Lay, Furniture Brands International, Gateway Computer, GE General Electric, General Foods International, General Mills, General Motors, Gentek, Gerber Foods, Gillette Company, Goodrich Company, Goodyear Tire, Gucci, Haagen-Dazs, Harley Davidson, Hasbro Company, Heinz Foods, Hershey Foods, Hitachi, Hoffman-LaRoche, Holt’s Automotive Products, Hormel Foods, Home Depot, Honda Motor, Hoover Vacuum, HP Computer, Honda, Honeywell, Hubbell Inc., Huggies, Hunts-Wesson Foods, ICON Office Solutions, IBM, Ikea, Intel Corporation, J.M. Smucker Company, John Deere, Johnson Control, Johnson & Johnson, Johnstone Supply, JVC Electronics, KB Home, Keebler Foods, Kenwood Audio, Kimberly Clark, Knorr Foods, Kohler, Kohl’s Corporation, Kraft Foods, Kragen Auto, Land’s End, Lee Kum Kee Foods, Lexmark, LG Electronics, Lipton Foods, L.L. Bean, Inc., Logitech, Libby’s Foods, Linen & Things, Lipo Chemicals, Inc., Lowe’s Hardware, Lucent Technologies, Lufkin, Mars Candy, Martha Stewart Products, Mattel, McCormick Foods, McKesson Corporation, Megellan GPS, Memorex, Merck & Company, Mitsubishi Electronics, Mitsubishi Motors, Mobile Oil, Molex, Motorola, Motts Applesauce, Multifoods Corporation, Nabisco Foods, National Semiconductor, Nescafe, Nestles Foods, Nextar, Nike, Nikon, Nivea Cosmetics, Nokia Electronics, Northrop Grumman Corporation, NuSkin International, Nvidia Corporation, Office Depot, Olin Corporation, Old Navy,
Olympus Electronics, Orion-Knight Electronics, Pacific Sunwear, Inc., Pamper’s, Panasonic, Pan Pacific Electronics, Panvise, Papa Johns, Payless Shoesource, Pelco, Pentax Optics, Pep Boy’s, Pepsico International, Petco, Pfizer, Inc., Philips Electronics, Phillip Morris Companies, Pierre Cardin, Pillsbury Company, Pioneer Electronics, Pitney Bowes, Inc., Plantronics, PlaySchool Toys, Polaris Industries, Polaroid, Post Cereals, Pfister, Pringles,
Praxair, Proctor & Gamble, PSS World Medical, Pyle Audio, Qualcomm, Quest One, Ralph Loren, RCA, Reebok International, Reynolds Aluminum, Revlon, Rohm & Hass Company, Samsonite, Samsung, Sanyo, Shell Oil, Schwinn Bike, Sears-Craftsman, Sharp Electronics, Sherwin-Williams, Shure Electronics, Sony, Speco Technologies, Skechers Footwear, SmartHome, Smucker’s, Solar Power, Inc., Stanley Tools, Staple’s, Steelcase, Inc., STP Oil, Sunkist Growers, SunMaid Raisins, Sunkist, Switchcraft Electronics, SYSCO Foods, Sylvania Electric, 3-M, Tamron Optics, TDK, Tektronix, Inc, Texas Instruments, Timex, Timken Bearing, Tommy Hilfiger, Toro, Toshiba, Tower Automotive, Toyota, Toy’s R Us, Inc., Tripp-lite, Tupper Ware, Tyson Foods, Uniden Electronics, Valspar Corporation, Victoria ‘s Secret, Vizio Electronics,
Volkswagen, VTech, WD-40 Corporation, Weller Electric Company, Western Digital, Westinghouse Electric, Weyerhaeuser Company, Whirlpool, Wilson Sporting Goods, Wrigley, WW Grainger, Inc., Wyeth Laboratories, X-10, Xelite, Xerox, Yamaha, Yoplait Foods, Yum Brands, Zale Corporation.

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3 Responses to "CHINA CLIMATE ACTION DECLARATIONS"

China declaration climate change.

If you believe this announcement, I have a big orange bridge to sell you.

Barcelona chairman and board resign.

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