Thongchai Thailand

AN UNCONSTRAINED BUREAUCRACY

Posted on: February 25, 2019

The explanation of the oddity that all climate impacts are bad, that all bad things are climate impacts, and that in the science of climate impacts there is no good impact and no attribution failure in the face of large uncertainties is that climate science is not unbiased objective scientific inquiry but agenda driven to provide the rationale needed for a pre-determined climate action agenda. The climate action agenda is not made to fit the science but rather it is the science that has to fit the climate action agenda.

[LINK TO HOME PAGE OF CHAAMJAMAL.COM]

Press Conference at the Launch of the IPCC Synthesis Report

Press Conference at the Launch of the IPCC Synthesis Report (Tivoli Conference Center, Lumbye Room) (REMARKS, Q&A) (with Mrs. Ban) (Nesirky)

Climate change deal struck at Paris Summit

ozoneskincancer

[LIST OF POSTS ON THIS SITE]

THE UNITED NATIONS IS AN UNCONSTRAINED BUREAUCRACY

ABSTRACT: It is well known that public sector bureaucracies without adequate constraint, oversight, audit, and accountability can devolve into self-serving organisms. The United Nations and its many agencies and programs are ultimately funded by taxpayers but they are too far removed from those taxpayers to be directly accountable to them. But who will discipline the UN? Agency theory ensures that no single country will venture to absorb the cost of disciplining the UN while gaining only pro-rata benefits. United Nations agencies and programs like the UNEP, IPCC, UNCFCCC, the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol and their related frameworks, conventions and other bureaucratic artifacts are therefore allowed to operate under insufficient constraint, transparency, oversight, or discipline. Under these conditions they can morph into bureaucratic organisms that operate for their own needs and no longer serve the public interest. A case study of the UNEP and its related agencies, programs, framework conventions, and protocols exposes structural weaknesses that allowed the bureaucracy to extract rents and grow by selling environmental fear and assigning themselves the high office of saving the planet. This sequence was played out in two different episodes.

In the first episode a fear of ozone depletion was sold and after successfully implementing a worldwide ban on alleged ozone depleting substances, the UN declared victory even though no evidence exists of long term trends in latitudinally averaged global mean total column ozone. The absence of trends indicates that the problem that was solved never existed in the first place. Deetails of the ozone depletion scare are provided in related posts on this site: [LINK]   In the second episode, they sold fear of catastrophic global warming and climate change allegedly caused by fossil fuel emissions in an interglacial where four natural global warming cycles preceded the current global warming cycle. The attribuion to humans is based only on the observation that the industrial revolution preceded the begining of the warming that was originally claimed to be 1760 and then moved in stages all the way up to 1950 to fit the data. This hypothesis cannot be tested because a hypotheesis derived from the data cannot be tested with the same data. More to the point, the UN failed to duplicate their success in the first episode. The UN’s utter confusion in global warming issue created an endless series of annual meetings of thousands of delegates at exotic locations with the only concrete achievement of each meeting being that of setting the date and place for the next meeting. Related post: [LINK]  

These episodes serve as evidence that unconstrained and undisciplined public sector bureaucracies do not serve the interest of the public. They can therefore be safely dismantled without any harm to the public interest.

The United Nations is financed mostly by taxpayers from a few donor countries but the large and growing bureaucracy is too far removed from those taxpayers to be directly accountable to them. It is run by unelected, unaccountable, undisciplined, and incompetent bureaucrats. The organization’s size, budget, and scope are unconstrained. The budget funding process provides perverse incentives for these bureaucrats to increase the size and scope of their organization simply by creating multitudes of agencies and programs, and by inventing problems and environmental crises set on a global scale.The remarkable success of the EPA of the USA made it a model for environmental law and environmental protection in countries around the world (Ruckelshaus, 1984) (Andreen, 2004) (Dolin, 2008). It was in this context that renowned Canadian environmentalist and visionary Maurice Strong saw the need for a global version of the EPA that could work at a planetary level with a global reach unhindered by national boundaries (Ward, 1972). He convened the UN meeting on the environment in Stockholm in 1972. The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) was conceived in Stockholm and soon thereafter approved by the UN General Assembly with Maurice Strong as its first Executive Director (Bodansky, 2001) (Ball, 2015).

The UNEP quickly became the nucleus of a large and growing cluster of United Nations agencies, secretariats, programs, frameworks, conventions, protocols, and conferences. As of this writing they include the Montreal Protocol, the Ozone Secretariat, the Kyoto Protocol, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), Agenda 21, United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA), UNEP Climate Action, and long sequence of Conference of Parties (COP) annual meetings starting with COP1 in 1995 to COP21 in 2015.Planetary Environmentalism: Ozone Depletion:

CONCLUSIONS

It is well known that public sector bureaucracies without adequate constraint, oversight, audit, and accountability can devolve into self-serving organisms. The United Nations and its many agencies and programs are ultimately funded by taxpayers but they are too far removed from those taxpayers to be directly accountable to them. But who will discipline the UN? Agency theory ensures that no single country will venture to absorb the cost of disciplining the UN while gaining only pro-rata benefits. United Nations agencies and programs like the UNEP, IPCC, UNCFCCC, the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol and their related frameworks, conventions and other bureaucratic artifacts are therefore allowed to operate under insufficient constraint, transparency, oversight, or discipline. Under these conditions they can morph into bureaucratic organisms that operate for their own needs and no longer serve the public interest. A case study of the UNEP and its related agencies, programs, framework conventions, and protocols exposes structural weaknesses that allowed the bureaucracy to extract rents and grow by selling environmental fear and assigning themselves the high office of saving the planet. This sequence was played out in two different episodes. In the first episode a fear of ozone depletion was sold and after successfully implementing a worldwide ban on alleged ozone depleting substances, the UN declared victory even though no evidence exists of long term trends in latitudinally averaged global mean total column ozone. The absence of trends indicates that the problem that was solved never existed in the first place. In the second episode, they sold fear of catastrophic global warming and climate change allegedly caused by fossil fuel emissions but failed to duplicate their success in the first episode because their own bureaucratic incompetence created an emissions reduction plan that was too complicated too costly to implement. These barriers ensured an endless series of annual meetings of thousands of delegates at exotic locations with the only concrete achievement of each meeting being that of setting the date and place for the next meeting. These episodes serve as evidence that unconstrained and undisciplined public sector bureaucracies do not serve the interest of the public. They can therefore be safely dismantled without any harm to the public interest. 

RELATED POST ON THE DANIELJMITCHELL SITE: [LINK]  

APPENDIX: CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE IPCC REPORTS

Although the IPCC was set up as an independent and neutral scientific body to objectively synthesize the current state of climate science purely on its merits and to translate that information into possible impacts and their policy implications, no UN oversight mechanism existed to ensure its objectivity or to audit the scientific credibility of its work. Possibly due to outside influences, the organization quickly turned into an advocacy group for CAGW with their AR documents closely following the Hansen narrative describing the catastrophic consequences of fossil fuel emissions (Hansen, 1988) (Hansen, 2016) (IPCC, 2007) (IPCC, 2014). There is no mention of opposing views or of alternative interpretations of the data in these documents. Large uncertainties in natural flows and in the various estimates of the so called “climate sensitivity” parameter were downplayed. The range of values of uncertain variables are reported as 90% Confidence Intervals (CI) even after the National Academy of Sciences published “Revised standards for statistical evidence” that implied that the appropriate CI should be greater than 99% (Johnson, 2013). Errors in past forecasts were ignored and successive AR reports continued to increase the extent of climate catastrophe in their forecasts. The IPCC AR reports are biased. They are primarily concerned with selling the idea of climate change calamity and its mitigation by emission reduction. Their use of science is limited to its utility in supporting that primary purpose. The bias in IPCC AR documents is documented in a 2010 commentary by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency which took it upon itself to audit the IPCC AR4 WG2 forecasts and concluded that “The IPCC systematically favors adverse outcomes in a way that goes beyond serving the needs of policymakers.” (PBL, 2010). Some points from the PBL audit are summarized below.
1. Exaggeration: The area in the Netherlands that the IPCC said was at risk of flooding by the sea was exaggerated.
2. A systemic tendency by the IPCC to stress negative effects of climate change and to ignore positive effects to the point of a built in misleading bias in the IPCC reports.
3. A systemic tendency to make generalized statements that actually refer to localized data: Example 1. The statement that “by 2020 in some countries yields from rain fed agriculture could be reduced to 50%” was based on a paper that was specific to Morocco. Also the paper said that the 50% reduction in yields would occur only in drought years and not in other years. This information was left out of the IPCC report and the yield reduction was generalized to all years.

4. A systemic tendency to make generalized statements that actually refer to localized data: Example 2. A statement in a source document about lower yields of millet, groundnuts, and cowpeas in Niger was generalized by the IPCC to the entire Sahel region and to all crops.

5. A systemic tendency to make generalized statements that actually refer to localized data: Example: A statement in the source document specific to cattle in Argentina was generalized by the IPCC to all livestock in all of South America.

6. Statements are made without any supporting data or references: Example: The claim by the IPCC that fresh water availability in southern and eastern Asia will decline is not supported by data or by a citation.
7. Statements are made without any supporting data or references: Example: The claim by the IPCC that in balance the net health effect of global warming in Europe will be negative is not supported by data or by a citation.
8. Bad news bias: Where an alarmist statement is supported by a citation, the IPCC interpretation is more alarmist than the text in the citation. Bad news bias: The IPCC report tends to be unremittingly about the harmful impacts of climate change. There is a complete absence of beneficial impacts.
10. Vulnerability bias: Countries classified by the IPCC as vulnerable are asked to make a self-assessment of their vulnerability. These self-assessments are included in the AR without modification. It is known that vulnerability is directly proportional to adaptation funding from Annex-1 countries. The opportunity and motivation for bias in these self-assessments are ignored by the IPCC.
11. The alarming and negative impression of IPCC reports on their readers would not exist if the IPCC presented the source material without bias and with a more narrow and objective interpretation without injecting the authors’ judgment.
12. Statistical fraud: A rise in heat related deaths in Australia is presented by the IPCC as due to rising temperatures. This rise disappears if we look at heat related deaths as a percent of population. This means that the IPCC misrepresented a population effect as a global warming effect. However, it must be said that it has not been determined whether this error is the product of fraud or of incompetence.

Yet another independent audit of the IPCC AR4 was carried out in 2011 by the Inter Academy Council. (IAC), an international scientific body. The IAC audit found as follows:
1. The IPCC does not address genuine controversies.
2. Probabilities of events are reported without sufficient evidence and without providing a basis for how the probability was evaluated.
3. IPCC communication and selection procedures emphasize secrecy not transparency,
4. A sufficiently wide range of scientific viewpoints is not considered and due consideration is not given to properly documented alternative views.

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8 Responses to "AN UNCONSTRAINED BUREAUCRACY"

[…] AN UNCONSTRAINED BUREAUCRACY […]

[…] is constructed in ways that serve the activism needs of the UN described in a related post [LINK] . Although the IPCC is treated and thought of as a climate science organization and the WMO is […]

This is very well written. High information value. Chilling in its implications.

[…] Having tasted the great success in the ozone depletion scare with the Montreal Protocol of 1987, and having seen the power of debilitating fear, the UNEP was now poised to take charge of the climate change issue as described by Hansen in his Congressional testimony of 1988 and related research papers.  describing it broadly as a global environmental crisis that can be addressed only at the global level and therefore only by the United Nations. The role of the United Nations in the extension of the AGW issue is described in a related post  [LINK] . […]

[…] Having tasted great success in the ozone depletion scare with the Montreal Protocol of 1987, and having seen the power of debilitating fear, the UNEP was now poised to take charge of the AGW issue as it had been described by Hansen in his Congressional testimony of 1988 and related research papers.  Describing it broadly as a global environmental crisis that can be addressed only at the global level and therefore only by the United Nations, the role of the United Nations in the extension of its ozone success of the AGW issue is thus established [LINK]. […]

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